Интересно,а чьи посудины нещадно топил Магелан? Судя по книжкам он вёл неограниченную надводную войну...

Отредактированно Буйный (07.08.2009 17:44:28)

а там посудин местных купцов и царьков хватало.   он же не к дикарям приплыл.

Буйный написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #102641
Интересно,а чьи посудины нещадно топил Магелан?

Васко да Гама.
Местных царьков и торговцев. Боевых судов там не было.

Выходит , что в 1580 - 1602 гг в Индии не существовало Португальских факторий ?Испании до Индии не было никакого интереса. В те годы - Великая армада , войны в Голландии. Англичанам и Голландцам тоже - свои проблемы.

Михаил написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #102729
что в 1580 - 1602 гг в Индии не существовало Португальских факторий ?

Почему?
Гоа, Дадра и Нагар-Хавели, Даман и Диу, а также Мумбаи

Вот описание на английском сражения за острова Банта

Bantam - 25 to the 30th of December of 1601

The systematic going of numerous Dutch ships to the Asian South-east, which began to happen from 1598, endangering the commercial monopoly which they were enjoying in that region, vein a lot of dificil created to the Portugueses a problem of strategic order of deciding.
The radical solution for this problem would have been, obviously, the blockade of the Dutch ports through a sufficiently strong navy based on the Escalda. But that, inside the existent state of affairs, was responsibility of the Spaniards, who, in spite of several attempts that they did in this sense, were never able to get. Leaving from there, the problem was becoming extremely complicated because the Dutch navies, once in the wide sea, so much could appear in Brazil, as in Saint Tomé, as in Luanda, as in Mozambique, as in Mombaça, as in Street vendor, as in Ormuz, as in Diu, as in any other city of the western coast of India, as in any port of the island of Ceilão, as in the coast of the Coromandel, as in the Achém, as in Illness, as in Bantam, as in Amboíno, as in the islands of Band, as in Ternate or Tidore, as in Macao or in Japan. And, since it is for the rest obviously, the Portugueses could not have sufficiently strong navies in all these places that allowed to them to be beaten on equal terms with the Dutchwomen.
The only thing that they could do was to concentrate his navy of India in that of those points and to be(stay) there to the wait that it was appearing a Dutch navy trying to destroy so that. Since they managed to capture or sink a sufficiently lifted up number of ships of these navies, the respective Companies would be bankrupted and they would stop ordering ships to the Orient. As a matter of fact, of beginning, the problem was presenting itself simplified enough because most of the Dutch navies constituted by a relatively small number of ships and since they directed to themselves, almost exclusively, the Bantam or to the Achém. It was so in these two points nevrálgicos that it would be concentrate the attention of the Portugueses, which not always was clearly gay.
In the initially existent strategic picture it would have been by chance sufficient to have maintained in permanence a navy of four galleons and some barges (last these for recognitions and other secondary missions) in the proximities of the strait of Sunda, similar other one in the Achém and, eventually, the third one of the same force, of reserve, in Goa. That would implicate to preserve twelve constantly operational galleons, which was perfectly compatible with the means logísticas and financial of the State of India.
But the problem was not so much of strategic order, not even logistics or financial, adapt very often if he(she) hears, but, especially, of technological order.
When of his arrival to India, had the Portugueses gained the power of the sea through his ships of high side, robust and armed with cannons from bronze, which were frankly superior to the Indian, very worse built ships and badly armed. However, to somewhat(little) and somewhat(little), for variadíssimas reasons, they were leaving the ships of high side and the combat of artillery on behalf of the ships of oar and of the combat to the approach. It will be opportune to remember that the first great naval battle that the Portugueses locked in India went to battle of Cananor of 1501, that it was gained exclusively through the use of the artillery. And the same thing happened in three battles of Cochim of 1504. However, in the battles of Cananor of 1506, of Ormuz of 1507 and in that of Chaul of 1508, though the decision has been still(even) obtained through the artillery, the hot embers unfold already under the form of combat to the cold steel. Finally, in the celebrated battle of Diu of 1509, the artillery and the combat to the approach they fulfill papers of equivalent importance. From there forward there are rare the battles in which the ships of high side and the artillery fulfill the principal paper.
From this evolution it turned out to be that in India, as as a matter of fact in the Metropolis for different reasons, the Portugueses stagnated on the subject of construction of ships of high side. And, when the quick ones and bolineiras "fluyts" did Dutchwomen appear in the seas of the Orient, in the beginnings of the century XVII, they were not disposing of ships able to reach them and to oblige fighting. Leaving from there, all the strategic and tactic congeminações, for more brilliant than they were(went,work hard), they were condemned beforehand to the failure. The naval battle of Bantam of 1601 constitutes a flagrant example of which we have just said.
When, in March or April of 1600, did reach Goa the first news of which there were walking many Dutch ships spread by all the Asian South-east, viceroy D. Francisco da Gama, with the "monsoon" at the door and most of his force pawned in the destruction of the Cunhale, as soon as it could order for Illness, in beginnings of May, two small galleys. Apparently, one of them will have been used by the captain of that city to transport for the Achém an ambassador of this kingdom who had had just arrived of Goa. Of other one it swims if he(she) knows, being of supposing that it has been to the service of the fortress.
In September of the same year of 1600, when there is already available the force that in the previous "Summer" had been used against the Cunhale, there was sent for Illness a relatively important navy composed by two galleons and three small galleys, to the command of D. Guterres of Monroy. Having reached that city, possibly, in November, D. Guterres incorporated in his navy a small galley that there was and directed to him the Amboíno and the Tidore in order to put those two fortresses in state(condition) of be defending if there the Dutchmen were appearing, sensible measure which vein to bear good fruits in the short term. When in May of 1601 van gives(give) Hagen tried to make our fortress of Amboíno, was repelled by losses; and the same thing happened, I eat already we come, the van Neck, when in June of the same year it did a similar attempt against the fortress of Tidore. So much in the outward trip for the Molucas as in that of return, the navy of D. Guterres of Monroy did not find any Dutch ship.
Meantime, there had assumed the government of India new viceroy Aires de Saldanha, who, in accordance with the orders that it had received of Lisbon, gave priority to the organization of a navy of ships of high side destined operating in permanence in the Asian South-east with the finality of expelling of there the Dutchmen.
In result of his diligence, in April of 1601 it released of Goa bound for Illness a new navy, under the command of André Furtado de Mendonça, constituted by four galleons, a galley and eighteen barges, in which nearly thousand and two hundred Portugueses were boarded, besides two thousand malabares and inhabitants of Goa.
If we attend what in Illness there had to join him two galleons and five small galleys that for there had been ordered in the previous year, we will not be able to stop agreeing that the navy of André Furtado was in fact a force quantitativamente appropriate to the mission of what was put in charge, which was, nothing any more swims less, of what to expel the Dutch ships of the seas of the Orient.
The nomination of André Furtado de Mendonça for captain - mor of the armed fortune had been advised animatedly to a Viceroy, both for the Governors of the Kingdom and for the Council of State of India. However, in spite of the enormous prestige which that one was enjoying, on account of the great victories that it had reached on the king of Jafnapatão and on the Cunhale, it does not seem to us that the choice has been happy. André Furtado had an unstable temperament, an unhealthy sensitivity and was, for nature, a pessimist and frustrated. On the other side, he was a very bitter champion of the old school of the ships of oar and of the combat to the cold steel, looking with suspicion at the ships of high side and at the combat of artillery. Above all, he was a Soldier of land and not a Sailor.
For admiral of the navy Tomé de Sousa Arronches was chosen and for captain - mor of the ships of oar Salvador Pereira of the Bramble, what had returned there was somewhat of the war of Ceilão. It will be essential to say, to avoid confusions, that in this time the post of "admiral" in the Spanish and Portuguese navies was corresponding to the performance of the functions of "second-commander" soon below the captain - mor.
The plan of campaign of the navy of André Furtado de Mendonça, adjusted in Goa, was including, apparently: to call at the Achém, in order to try to obtain of the respective king authorization to build there a fortress; to touch Illness, in order to be refueled, to incorporate the ships that there were and to obtain informations; to follow to Bantam in order to capture or destroy all the Dutch ships that that way were appearing, as well as destroy the Dutch managements that several Companies had there established; to follow then to Amboíno, in order to destroy the management that the Dutchmen there had installed and to punish the native kings who had helped them; to do the same thing in the islands of Band; for end, to follow to Tidore and, with the help of the Spaniards of the Philippines, to try to recover our ancient fortress of Ternate and destroy the management that the Dutchmen had installed in this island.
To(Her,It) ours to see, it was the question of a too ambitious plan of campaign that had the serious drawback of removed the navy of two points fulcrais what had to stipulate the whole strategic maneuver and what were, adapt already we had opportunity to say, the strait of Sunda and the Achém. On the other side, it gives the idea of which it will not have been when that the principal objective of the navy, to which others should be subordinated all, was the capture or the destruction of Dutch ships was explained well in the spirit of the chiefs.
The first enemy which André Furtado had to face was the bad time. After past the end Comorim, a violent storm was knocked down on the navy, provoking the dispersal of the ships. Some barges were wrecked in the coast of the island of Ceilão; others were sheltered in Pouring and in other ports; the galley accompanied by seven barges, managed to reach Colombo; a group constituted by a galleon and a barge and another group constituted by three galleons continued the way of the Achém.
Then there was lack of soldiers and of material of war in Ceilão and the general (general) of the conquest, D. Jerónimo de Azevedo, managed without difficulty to convince his(yours,your) ancient subordinate Salvador Pereira of the Bramble, who was much more useful to keep his ships and his men in Ceilão of which to follow to Illness, leaving it in danger. Apparently, the Viceroy finished by sanctioning this decision. In this way, it was the navy with what André Furtado had broken of Goa come down to four galleons and a barge with nearly six hundred and thirty Portugueses! It was in fact a rude blow that cannot have stopped affecting negatively the moral sense of the garrisons(garnishes) and of the captain - mor soon in the beginning of the campaign. For our part, we cannot stop attracting attention of the reader(lector) for this flagrant example of the harmful influence that the conquest of Ceilão had, in this time, regarding the naval operations of vital nature that were being carried out for the conservation of our empire of the Orient.
To the 8th of June it reached the Achém one of the galleons of the navy of André Furtado accompanied by a barge. To 19, being when being brought near of the port a « ship of Mecca », the captain of the barge, by his high recreation, it resolved went to take it without importing the insult in what about act it was acting for the king of the Achém, which good will was interesting to preserve. But the attempt resulted in disaster. Reached several times for the shots of the artillery of the ship and of the fortress of the Achém, which had hurried up opening fire to mark his sovereignity, the barge would be left by his garrison(garnish), what probably will have been it saves for the skiff of the galleon, and it gave to the coast, where it vanished.
Since it would be of waiting, in result of this incident the king of the Achém was very much upset by the Portugueses, so much more than it had had information of which if a navy of Jor was brought near, what the fez to suspect that there was a collusion of the king of this city with us in order that they were attacking.
To the 5th of July, second looks, it will have brought near to Stolen Achém André of Mendonça with others three galleons with which it had left from Goa. In the same day the navy of Jor presented herself also before the city. Immediately there went to his meeting that of the Achém, which after a short combat obliged it beating a retreat. Checking that the Portugueses had not taken any hostile attitude, the king of the Achém realized that there was not any understanding between them and the king of Jor and received very well André Furtado. However, it did not agree to the request you let to let us build a fortress next to the city for, we were saying knots, helping to defend itself against the Dutchmen.
When there failed the first point of his mission and with the navy come down to four galleons, André Furtado de Mendonça addressed for Illness.
There brought near, it began because of sending two small galleys of help to Tidore and, possibly, also the Amboíno, which(who) must have left in ends of August. Continuously, it negotiated of reorganizing the navy, being of use of the ships that were then in Illness and that were, besides two galleons and five small galleys that for there had been sent in the previous year, two or three ships and two merchants' reeds and some barges and bantins of the city. The navy properly stated will have to have been constituted by six galleons, two small galleys (besides the two that had been detached for Amboíno), two barges and eight bantins. The merchants' ships and the reeds it is probable that they have accompanied it only to benefit of his protection and not with the end of increasing his potential.
During the stay in Illness it is natural which André Furtado de Mendonça has been informed of that his armed darling of oar had been diverted for the war of Ceilão and that he has been made indignant, not only against Salvador Pereira of the Bramble but also against the Viceroy. In a letter that from there writes to a governor of the Philippines asking for him help for the reconquest of Ternate, he(she) complains bitterly of that, to the same time that laments the lack of ships of oar, without which, in his opinion, it could not carry out the mission of which it had been put in charge.
In fact, six galleons of which it was disposing, were they quicker and better of bowline, they would have been sufficient to create great difficulties to the Dutchmen. The lack of the galley with which it had gone out from Goa was, in fact, an absence to lament, since it might be of great usefulness, with his cannons of thick calibre, to attack for the stern the enemy ships in opportunities of calm. As for the barges, it does not seem to us that they could have great usefulness, without being for missions of recognition and operations of landing, tasks that also could be fulfilled by the bantins of Illness. There would no be, consequently, valid reasons able to justify the pessimism of André Furtado in a height in which he(she) was still not conscious of the inferiority of the Portuguese galleons regarding the Dutch "fluyts" regarding nautical qualities.
When set sail of Illness in beginnings of December of 1601, the Portuguese navy will have to have brought the Bantam near for middles of the month, anchoring next to the island of Pandjang, which is to way of the bay, in front of that city.


BANTAM - 1601

Apparently, already about times the Portugueses had thought in building a fortress in the above-mentioned island, for what they would have offered an elevated amount to an administrator of Bantam, who, nevertheless, did not accept the business. In the Kingdom there was the idea of which it was suitable to have a fortress in the proximities of the strait of Sunda. In India, on the contrary, one was thinking that there was already you fortify it more and that the essential one was to dispose of a strong navy of ships of high side to give combat in the sea to the Dutchmen. At last it was this last conception that prevailed. Therefore, it was not making part of the extensive list of objectives attributed to the navy of André Furtado to effectuate any diligence in the direction of a fortress to come to be built in the proximities of the strait of Sunda.
A few days after the arrival to Bantam, annexed to our navy eight corocoras (?) of the king of Palembang, who in times had been a vassal of Java and who intended to be used of the presence there of the Portugueses to adjust ancient counts.
The first Dutch ships of that our navy caught sight must have been the ships Midelburg and Zon come from the Achém, which, probably, did the travel on the inside from the strait of Illness. Having found the Portuguese navy positioned in force before Bantam, they took immediately the course of Amboíno. Given that the stated ships were quicker than our galleons and that they were leaving with advancement, André Furtado, sensatamente, it did not pursue them, when be limited to tell them to be on the lookout for some bantins. In circumstances that we did not know, one of these bantins was captured by the Dutchmen in the coast of Bornéu, being even taken then to the Celebes, where it was left.
Perceptibly over the same height it was passing far off of Balimbing a Dutch navy commanded by Wophert Harmensz, composed by the ships Gelderland, Zeeland and Utrecht and by the two-masted pinnaces Of Wachter and Het Duifke. Being that one informed by a Chinese vessel of what in Bantam was a great Portuguese navy, it joined immediately advice(council), in which it was decided to continue forward and, necessary, give him combat.
In result of this decision, the Dutch navy penetrated resolutamente in the strait of Sunda and, to the dawn from the 25th of December of 1601, caught sight of two Portuguese galleons anchored near the tip NW of the island of Java. It was the question of the galleon of Tomé de Sousa Arronches and of other that there they had been placed of watching. Naturally that Harmensz was not going to miss the opportunity of fighting in the proportion of five against two and it advanced at full speed against the Portuguese ships. For his part, Tomé de Sousa let it be approaching and, in the opportune moment, lifted, released the cloth and he(she,you) was crossed in the front. Leaving from there two navies must have headed perceptibly to NE with calm wind when it was moderated by the alheta of BB, being bombed mútuamente. It is of supposing that the Gelderland has associated with the Portuguese admiral ship and that the Zeeland has associated with another galleon. Since all the ships had to be going walking quite well it is of supposing that the Utrecht and two two-masted pinnaces have not had opportunity for reaching a good position of shot and, practically, they have not come taking part in the dispute.
In the combat of artillery in the sea, when there are perceptibly the same the calibre and the number of cannons of two ships wrapped in a duel of artillery, the luck fulfills a decisive paper. In this case, the luck favored the Portugueses. Without having lost the only man, the ship of Tomé de Sousa managed to provoke a certain number of decreases in the Gelderland, destroy great part of the shrouds and, finally, damage the rudder. Little then, it was bursting a piece on board of the Dutch ship, which came to aggravate still more his situation. Meantime, the thick of the Portuguese navy, which was near the island of Pandjang, had lifted iron and had been sailing for north, had being ready be crossing in the front of the Dutch navy.
It is possible what Harmensz, of beginning, had intended to break by force through the Portuguese navy and to address for the Molucas, since Bantam was blockaded. But now, with his seriously damaged admiralship and a strong concentration of Portuguese ships before you(him,her,them), it is of supposing that it has changed of ideas and when to return backwards was resolved, in order to be recomposed. Therefore, it will have turned in wheel and when a side was done for land, estimating the most possible thing. It will have checked then that the Portuguese ships were not able to accompany his bowline, which will have taken it, probably, going to anchor near the coast, her(it) around league and a half of the island of Pandjang, to be able to repair more comfortably the damages that it had suffered. The Portuguese navy, navigating the lee of the Dutchwoman and more opened of what it links regarding the wind, anchored again in the proximities of that island.
In the position in which they were, with wind and current exactamente come from the side in which the enemy was and being weak of bowline, the Portuguese ships had not the least possibility to reach place where the Dutchmen were. Therefore, the day 26 went by unless any war action had been registered, when there are limited two adversaries to point out to him while they were repairing the damages suffered in the eve combat.
On the day 27, André Furtado decided to launch an attack with his ships of oar that, I already eat we had opportunity to say, there were his favorite weapon. Apparently, it will have divided them in two groups, each one of them constituted by a small galley, a barge and, possibly, three or four bantins. One of these groups was captained by André Rodrigues, famously Thatched hut, and it had since mission boarded the Gelderland; another group, which was captained by D. Francisco de Sousa, had to board the Utrecht.
The Dutch ships, since it is obvious, were with the sterns, his most weak sector, turned for the side from where the Portugueses were coming. Therefore, it must not have been difficult to our ships of oar they are put in this sector and they begin beating them with his artillery, which, unfortunately, was not including cannons of thick calibre. (For situations of this é what were needed the galleys.) The Dutchmen answered with few pieces that had got on the stern and with intense fire of mosquetaria. To the end of some time, the small galleys and the barges, hiding under the batteries of the enemy ships and, being extended by them, grasped us. In each group it is natural what the small galley has moored to the ship that was his responsibility for one of the sides while the barge was trying to do it for another side. But the approach was not succeeded well. There was great wave(vacancy), which was shaking violently the small ships of oar and was making them give strong blows against the backs of the ships, making the escalation very difficult for our soldiers of this. Besides, there of the top there were raining on them like hail the quite directed bullets of the Dutch muskets that were killing them like thrushes. Possibly, most of the attackers will have been killed same before having managed to set foot in the deck of the Dutch ships. The few ones that got it, between them André Rodrigues, were soon gone by great number of quite armed enemies and equally skillful in the play of the arms and, in spite of the courage with which they were beaten, were quickly liquidated. Apparently, from the garrisons(garnishes) of two small galleys there will have hardly escaped a scarce ten of Portugueses, who were prisoners of the Dutchmen and over whom, in a gesture of rare nobility, it told Harmensz to hand subsequently to André Furtado without asking anything in exchange.
As for the barges, it is of supposing what they have not come grasping or what, having done it, have felt such difficulties in getting a beating for before the attempt of approach that they have opted to withdraw, probably already with enough dead men and injured ones. The bantins will have to have limited following the action to the distance, finishing by accompanying the barges in the retreat. Having been left practically without people, two small galleys that were grasped to the ships were easily taken for the Dutchmen, who, after having withdrawn of them everything that could have some usefulness, put them fire.
This one badly succeeded attack carried out by our ships of oar, in spite of the courage and the determination when to demonstrate again that those were not the ships adapted to fight with the well built ones, well artilhadas and quite equipped Dutch ships was patented by the captains and by the garrisons(garnishes) of the small galleys, vein. Only the unconciousness of André Furtado and of his captains allowed that there was conceived and executed an operation that beforehand was condemned to the failure and resulted in the loss of two small galleys and of nearly fifty men.
As for us, the only thing that era might have been tried to have told two small galleys to bomb intensely for the stern the enemy ship that was more to leeward, in the hope of provoking him entries of water that were making it go to the bottom. And it swims more. To try the approach in the molds in which it was effectuated was a true suicide, how it was(went).
On the day 28, André Furtado de Mendonça, who was not resigning himself assuming urn attitude of mere expectation, told to turn two of the corocoras of Palembang into fire ships that, during the night of 28 for 29, were taken to a position to windward of the navy Dutch and when to drift after set alight was left. But in the evening it is very difficult to value distances. Two fire ships were launched early the rest and they wasted away before having reached the roadstead of the enemy navy, which, consequently, nothing suffered with them.
André Furtado, after moves all the "letters" of which it was disposing, did not know what to do. However, the next day, on 29th of December, Harmensz broke the impasse. Having finished the mending of the damages that had suffered in the combat of the day 25, it lifted and did to him in the turn of the sea, bound for NE. Our captain - mor followed him immediately the example in the hope of managing to intercept and to force to a decisive combat. However, to way of the afternoon, the wind fell completely and two navies were immobilized, out of the reach of shot, while they were dragged by the current for east.
To the dawn of the day 30, the wind recommenced blowing moderated of west. Seeing that it was not managing to reach the enemy, it told André Furtado to unfurl big seditious red urn challenging it for the combat to the approach. Little then, the Dutch navy was turning in wheel, giving the impression to the Portugueses that had accepted the challenge and that was addressing for them. But there was not this, not even for shadows, the intention of Harmensz, which was not properly a walking rider but yes a clever and conscious sailor of the interests of the shipowners on whose(which) count was working.
Having noted that the Portuguese navy trailed by the current, already was turned to leeward frankly regarding Bantam, it had understood that it could, without any danger, go to this port. Therefore it had done sign to turn of side. Continuously, estimating everything, it was directed for there, and went to anchor triunfalmente at the place that our navy had left!
Since the Portuguese galleons were feeling up very much somewhat and the current and the wind were of west, André Furtado ended, perhaps somewhat hurriedly, what nothing any more could do in Bantam. It dismissed the corocoras of Palembang and the bantins of Illness for the respective cities and, with six galleons, two barges and the merchant ships that it had in his company, took the way of Amboíno.
As for us, we think that urn was an unfortunate decision, for several reasons: first of all, leaving the field of battle to the Dutchman fez to think to the Javos that we had been defeated by them, which shook considerably the prestige which we were enjoying in the region in a height in which we were needing the support of the local kings in fighting those; at as place, because it was removing the navy of the strategic basic axle Achém-Bantam, diverting it for a peripheric zone and leaving the free field to the Dutchmen in the vital zones of the Achém, of the strait of Illness, of the estreiro of Singapura and of the strait of Sunda; at third place, because it was making much more difficult the refueling and the reinforcement of the navy from Illness.
In our opinion, the most important thing, in that height, it would have been him(her,you) to write to a Viceroy noticing the event and to showing the necessity of being begun without delays in India the construction of new galleons, less than the ancients but quicker and better of bowline, able to reach the Dutch ships, of to reach they to grasp and of burning(tanning) them with pans of gunpowder or if to be burned(tanned) by them. But it is clear what was treated as ideas that could not pass for the leader of André Furtado not even of his captains, men of a century that had passed and who were not able to understand the necessity of the evolution and as the constant adaptation face to the technological progress.
Anyway, our captain - mor might have remained, at least, with six galleons and two barges anchored in the coast, in the vicinities of Bantam and use the periods of calm to be bringing near them of the city, to making plastering the galleons for the barges and for his skiffs themselves or peep ancorotes. Proceeding so, it is probable that it had obliged the Dutchmen to leave the port and until it had could destroy four managements that there had. It might have continued then in Bantam even while turning of the monsoon (May), preventing other Dutch ships there from being going to overdo and hoping for the return from those who were coming from the loaded Molucas and, so, with less speed, from trying to intercept them again. In other words: as soon as it had not managed to impose to the enemy the decision through the battle, it might have resorted to the strategy of the « navy in power ».
Such as it happened, the naval battle of Bantam of 1601 constituted an enormous frustration for the Portugueses, in a height in which they were still disposing of human and material ways to put a dam to the Dutch tide that it was threatening to submerge them. And in her(it) it was demonstrated again that what they(you) were lacking there were good ships, good sailors and, especially, political and military chiefs with capacity to innovate.

wildcat написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #102826
Кстати, в этот же год или в 1511-м (точно не помню) ими была осуществлена экспедиция по покорению Маллакского султаната.

В 1511 году.

По голландцам. - Первая торговая голландская экспедиция, возглавляемая Корнелиусом Хутманом, прибыла в Бантам 23 июня 1596 года. Видимо это был галеон "Амстердам"

Amsterdam - 1594
Scheepstype: galjoen
In gebruik bij de VOC vanaf 1594 tot 11/01/1597 (VERBRAND).
Gebouwd op de werf te Amsterdam.
laadvermogen: 260 ton

Beschrijving:
De Amsterdam maakte deel uit van de vloot van vier schepen (Mauritius, Hollandia, Amsterdam en Duyfken) van de Compagnie van Verre (eerste Schipvaart) o.l.v. Cornelis de Houtman aan boord van de Mauritius. Het schip is wegens lekkage en bij gebrek aan bemanning achtergelaten en in brand gestoken bij Bawean op 11 januari 1597.

Reisgegevens:
reis    vertrek op    van    naar    aankomst op    kamer    schipper
1    02/04/1595    Texel    Engano    06/061596        Jan Jakobsz. Schellinger
    via:    Maio (Kaap Verde)    van 26/04/1595 tot 27/04/1595
    Mosselbaai    van 04/08/1595 tot 11/08/1595
    Ampalazabaai    van 13/09/1595 tot 07/10/1595
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В свое время уважаемый Эд дал хорошую ссылку на сайт по ГОИК. Успел кое что оттуда передрать. Как я понимаю, этот сайт сейчас умер или переехал.



Ген  штаты утвердили договор об образовании ГОИК 20 марта 1602 года, и особой хартией предоставили ГОИК монопольное право навигации и привилегированной торговли от мыса Доброй Надежды до Магелланова пролива, сроком на 21 год.

Отредактированно пьер (08.08.2009 04:21:26)

Михаил написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #102580
когда был образован первый флот , эскадра или отряд кораблей , который базировался на Индийские фактории???Вели ли они боевые действия на море с местными правителями или с Еворепейцами ???

В 17-18 вв. постоянных эскадр европейских ОИК или гос-в в Индии не было, приходившие в Индию суда непременно возвращались с «колонияльными товарами» обратно, все их базы были в Европе. Разумеется, на время войн в индийских водах продолжительное время находилисиь корабли ОИК и военные, но это было временно. У местных правителей, даже у Великих Моголв в период их расцвета ни флотов, ни кораблей не было, правда, упоминаются отдельные суда. Впрочем, имелся пиратский клан Ангрия, который, имея флотилию легких быстроходных судов, доставлял немало неприятностей европейским ОИК4 в 1756 г. это пиратское гнездо было разгромлено англ. эскадрой (с участием ОИК и Клайва). Я об этом сообщал на старой Цусиме.

Хронология такова: первыми в Индии утвердились португальцы, затем их потеснили голландцы, затем голландцев вытеснили англичане, голландцев интересовали пряности, т.е. Индонезия, они сохранили позиции на Цейлоне. После чего англичан попытались вытеснить французы. Следует отметить, что до начала широких захватов в Бенгалии, власть европейцев ограничивалась их опорными пунктами, т.е. не превосходила дальность стрельбы их пушек. Первая попытка англичан в 1688 г. расширить свои владения, опираясь на Бомбей, чуть было не привела к потере самого Бомбея.

Морские войны: в 1630-60-х гг. голландцев с португальцами – в основном, блокада Гоа голл-ской ОИК. Далее, во время последующих европейских войн в индийских водах были лишь стычки судов разных ОИК и каперов. «Настоящие» морские войны были в 1746-49, 1758-59 и 1779-83 гг.

Михаил написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #103147
Можно о этих событих по подробнее

Гы....))))

Тут книги не хватит...)))
Одно соперничество Бурдонэ и Дюпле чего стоит.

Эд написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #102874
Кажется, вот этот сайт:
http://voc.verzamelgids.nl/
Здесь все корабли ОИК, губернаторы и адмиралы.

Похожий, но другой. Я нашел его:

http://www.vocsite.nl/schepen/lijst.html

Но за эту ссылку так же спасибо.

У меня вопрос возник. Не было ли столкновения между испанцами и голландцами в районе Манилы. Попалась пара судов, сгоревших в Маниле 25.04.1610г.:

Amsterdam - 1605
In gebruik bij de VOC vanaf 1605 tot 25/04/1610 (VEROVERD, Manilla).

Arend - 1607
Scheepstype: jacht
In gebruik bij de VOC vanaf 1607 tot 25/04/1610 (VERBRAND, Manilla).

По Амстердаму есть еще фраза:
De Amsterdam is, net als de Valk en de Arend, veroverd door de Spanjaarden bij Manilla op 25/04/1610.

Учитывая, что с языками у меня проблемы, тем более с голландским, этот вопрос и возник, т.к. "VEROVERD" по голландски вроде бы значит "сгорел", а "veroverd door" - значит "сгорел полностью".

Отредактированно пьер (09.08.2009 03:15:29)

По Голландской и Английской Ост-Индийской компании информация есть , а по остальным??
Есть ли сайты по Французской , Датской и Португальской ???
если есть , то скинте ссылки на сайты по этой теме

Эд написал:

Оригинальное сообщение #103287
Это означает "захвачен испанцами в Маниле".
verbrand - "сожжен".

Понятно. Значит, получается, что Amsterdam и Arend Были захвачены испанцами в Маниле, при этом Arend был сожжен.